Sunday, May 28, 2006

Critical Thinking and the Duelfer Report

Stephen,
Upon review of the Duelfer report, not just Annex D, but including Annex D, I came to the conclusion that the decision to invade is vindicated. It only reinforces what I had already heard and read regarding the threat posed Saddam's defiance of the UN sanctions.

Your conclusion that "experts" determined the trailers to be "useless for producing bioweapons" is not supported by Annex D or any other part of the final ISG report. Also the ISG pays more respect to the second team which you describe as "analysts or officials".
A second examination was undertaken by a team of scientific experts, after Al Kindi personnel suggested the trailers were for hydrogen production. Their report concluded, “The trailers have equipment and components possibly compatible with biological agent production and/or chemical processes that might include hydrogen production.

It seems likely to me that the final team is probably even more specialized than the second team and was brought in to do an even more thorough examination. However, this does not mean that the other teams should be casually dismissed.

At any rate, what the ISG actually concludes in Annex D, is that the trailers were very unlikely to have been used for BW (bioweapons), and consistent with hydrogen production. That is not the same as impossible or useless for BW, or exclusively useful for Hydrogen. Also, it should be noted the interviews with the "Highly Valued Detainees" reported in annex D did not support the hydrogen model.

The third team concludes that the trailer (they only report an examination of one trailer) would have required major and costly modifications for BW use.
This assessment focuses on Trailer 1 because it appeared to have a complete set of equipment.
Though I mention they only examine one trailer, I did not overlook their explanation for doing so. While the ISG reports that the level of completion of the unexamined trailer is consistent with Iraqi documents, nevertheless, the report does not include a focused assessment of that trailer. Furthermore, other parts of the report note that both trailers had been looted. They don't say what the extent of the looting is, or that it is even knowable. While it may not be the ISG's mandate to speculate on everything that could have been removed, there may be a gap between what Al Kindi produced, and what the ISG was able to examine. This is not irrelevant, given the Regime's long history of dual use technologies.

There is another element missing from the ISG report. It is an unaddressed discrepancy between the findings of the first team, and this report.
On 19 April 2003, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) elements confiscated a tractor and trailer near a checkpoint at Tall Kayf in northern Iraq. The trailer was stolen by a looter . . .US forces then moved the trailer to Irbil air base for further investigation. . . The gooseneck trailer has two rear axles and accommodation in the frame for a third also at the rear. A telescoping rod, which could raise roughly nine meters, was located at the rear left corner of the trailer. Roughly three to four inches of a solid light brown material beneath a one half-inch liquid layer was inside. Despite wearing protective mask, an ammonia odor was noted. The pH of the material was fourteen. A rusted hand shovel was located at the base of the reaction vessel. . .

It mentions liquid and solid material “inside”. How surprisingly vague that is. "Inside" what, the trailer? Does this mean on the floor of the trailer? Also, the DIA paper noted that material within the [alleged] fermentor was tested positive for azide and urea (inconsistent with hydrogen production) along with other substances. Other substances were mentioned in the ISG report, but not the azide or the urea, not even to say they are insignificant to the judgment.
In May 2003, analysis was carried out on seven samples taken from key equipment locations on the trailer, including powder and slurry taken from the ‘reactor vessel’. No evidence of BW organisms was detected. The complete absence of proteins and the minute amounts of phosphorus and sulfur present were deemed inconsistent with normal bio-production.

Shouldn’t they have mentioned it, even if it was human waste, given that this report is written by experts for the benefit of non-experts? (Do you honestly think it likely the azide came from human waste)? Was the first team wrong about azide and/or urea not being consistent with hydrogen production? If so, why didn't the ISG include it in their findings that support the hydrogen model?

The following excerpts pertain to various parts of the Duelfer report, they are not all from annex D, nor are they specifically in regard to the trailers.

Consider the contradiction between two sections in the report. The first statement is in the key findings regarding Biological Weapons in volume III. The two statements after are from the key findings for Finance and Procurement in volume I.
The years following Desert Storm wrought a steady degradation of Iraq’s industrial base: new equipment and spare parts for existing machinery became difficult and expensive to obtain, standards of maintenance declined, staff could not receive training abroad, and foreign technical assistance was almost impossible to get. Additionally, Iraq’s infrastructure and public utilities were crumbling. New large projects, particularly if they required special foreign equipment and expertise, would attract international attention. UN monitoring of dual-use facilities up to the end of 1998, made their use for clandestine purpose complicated and risk laden.


Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate and implement strategies, policies, and methods to terminate the UN’s sanctions regime established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations’ member states and other international players’ resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis.


Saddam’s increasing illegitimate revenue and profits from UN oil sales compensated for legitimate revenue loses. Illicit oil revenue provided Saddam with sufficient funds to pay off his loyalists and expand selected illicit procurement programs. From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency.

Note the very equivocal language of the 1st quote in relation to the very decisive language in the last two.

Note here, the pressure Saddam was exerting against the UN to lift sanctions:
November 27, 2001 Iraq rejects a call by U.S. President George Bush to let United Nations weapons inspectors back into the country to determine whether it is building weapons of mass destruction. An Iraqi spokesman states that, before asking Iraq to allow weapons inspectors to return, the United Nations should lift the 11-year-old sanctions on Iraq and the West should abolish the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq.

Saddam had reason to believe the UN was weakening in its commitment, not just because of back door deals, but also because of open proposals to policy change.
December 17, 1999 The U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 1284 on returning weapons inspectors to Iraq. Under the Resolution, sanctions could be suspended if Iraq were to cooperate with the inspectors over a period of nine months. Iraq has stated that it does not accept the Resolution, which also creates the new United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) for Iraq.

Here we see the weakening commitment, with Saddam holding out for a better deal. Note his refusal to cooperate for even 9 mos. in exchange for lifted sanctions. Clearly, this man felt more threatened by inspections than sanctions.

The sanctions and inspections were not holding Saddam. Perhaps they were slowing him down, but it's irresponsible to think they would have held indefinitely. He was defying the sanctions, and to this day, no one can account for all that Saddam was required to declare. The best we can do is speculate.

You can assume, if you like, that the unaccounted materials were destroyed, or have naturally degraded. Or were they transported out as suggested by David Kay?

"There is ample evidence of movement to Syria before the war -- satellite photographs, reports on the ground of a constant stream of trucks, cars, rail traffic across the border. We simply don't know what was moved," Kay said.


And Kay is not the only source for this argument. Refer to this post from Endymion, entitled "Yet Another Reason to Believe Saddam had WMD" from March 27, 2006. Follow the links from there as well to get the complete evidence.

You can assume, if you like, that Saddam evaded inspectors because he was preserving the illusion of WMD capability as a means of self defense. Or, was that a ruse, to rationalize his misbehavior? We may never know. We do know that by failing to hold him to the inspections and sanctions, we rendered those devices practically useless. Consider this excerpt from the ISG report:

They had anthrax seed spores right up to the time of the invasion. Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al ‘Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she retained BW seed stocks until early 1992 when she destroyed them. ISG has not found a means of verifying this. Some seed stocks were retained by another Iraqi official until 2003 when they were recovered by ISG.


Iraq would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. Nevertheless, after 1996 Iraq still had a significant dual-use capability—some declared—readily useful for BW if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover,Iraq still possessed its most important BW asset, the scientific know-how of its BW cadre.


Kinda like his nuclear mujahadeen, huh?

Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a course.


Not finding his intentions is not the same as him not having them. Besides, I wonder what he kept the anthrax seed spores for, his scrapbook?

In spite of the difficulties noted above, a BW capability is technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although equipment and facilities were destroyed under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW know-how through the scientists that were involved in the former program. ISG has also identified civilian facilities and equipment in Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used for the production of agent.


So, go ahead and quibble over an over enthusiastic reaction to some disappointing evidence. It seems true the president erred in overstating the importance of the trailers. But what kind of ridiculous apology is, "I'm sorry that the trailers probably, but not definitely, are not mobile BW labs, and might be for hydrogen, but that's not definite either". Stephen, you yourself either overstated the findings of the ISG, or placed too much faith in Warrik's unverifiable sources. Your behavior is not so different from that which you criticize. Your comments are the kind of hindsight rhetoric that discourages weaker politicians from taking risks in order to defend the country and defeat tyranny. It is irresponsible for a citizen to prioritize public relations to a level that overshadows the good that has been done and should be done.

2 comments:

Late Bloomer said...

Stephen's comment submitted under the wrong post:

For that matter, I should apologize because the other two teams did have technical experts on them. I still think that the first two were prone to pressure from above to find a smoking gun, which is why it took three separate teams (with the last being composed of people whose reputations and diligence were above reproach) to conclude the matter.

My response:

More than that, you way overstated the findings of the third team. Why don't you admit that? The first two teams were under pressure from whom, exactly? What is your evidence? As we have seen here at Sub Cultro, you always take the side of the anti-Bush folks in matters of one's word against the other. Whose reputations in the first two teams were not above reproach? Furthermore, Duelfer, apparently above reproach, hardly supports your view regarding Saddam. He testified that the sanctions were degrading, and that they were perverting international markets. He testified that Saddam certainly intended to resume his programs as soon as sanctions were lifted. He also testified that there is no way to know if WMD were transported out just before the invasion. True, he states he did not believe stockpiles existed at the time of the invasion, but he did believe that the sanctions were a failure, and that Saddam intended to resume WMD production. All these things were also stated by David Kay, whose reputation and diligence you appear to question.

Anonymous said...

I don't disagree with the assesment that once sanctions were lifted Saddam would have gone full out to produce WMD. That is one reason why I was not against the decision to invade, but there are some problems with the justifications actually given and the plans for the occupation that need to be accounted for.

In fact, I would say that I agree completely with this David Kay statement.